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INTRODUCTION 
The Rehnquist Court is widely believed to be the most con-
servative Court in recent memory. Especially in the legal acad-
emy, the Rehnquist Court has a reputation as being conservative 
in its politics, 1 originalist in its interpretive commitments/ and 
suspicious of the New Deal. Mark Tushnet wonders whether the 
Rehnquist Court has shaken the American constitutional order 
so profoundly that "the New Deal/Great Society political system 
is no longer in place.''3 Tushnet is no supporter of the Rehnquist 
Court,4 but many of the Court's defenders and admirers share 
the same view. In the most ambitious defense of the Rehnquist 
Court to date, John McGinnis insists that the Court's "reflects a 
more skeptical view of centralized democracy in an era in which 
there is more elite skepticism about the prospects of nationally 
mandated social reform than existed in the eras of the New Deal 
and Great Society."5 
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I. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Conservative "Paths" of the Rehnquist 
Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002). 
2. See, e.g., Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory 
and Consticwional Imerpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994). 
3. Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitwiona/ Order and the Chastening of 
Constillltiona/ Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 30 (1999). 
4. Otherwise he would not have written MARK TL:SHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
5. John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquisc Court's Ju-
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As widespread as this view is, there is at least one good rea-
son to doubt it. It treats Supreme Court Justices too much as 
trend setters and too little as trend followers. Most Justices get 
their offices by dint of distinguished practice or public service, 
not extensive post-graduate academic training. Quite often, they 
assume the truth of normative opinions that either are conven-
tional among legal elites when they serve on the Court, or were 
so when they went to law school. As John Maynard Keynes once 
explained, public officials often write into law political philoso-
phy they learned "from academic scribblers of a few years back." 
They do so not "immediately, but after a certain interval; for in 
the field of economic and political philosophy there are not 
many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-
five or thirty years of age. "6 
Obviously, no single article could explore this doubt in any 
comprehensive way. Yet there is a surprisingly simple way to 
demonstrate that it deserves attention-to reexamine how the 
Rehnquist Court has treated separation of powers. Separation of 
powers law counts as one of the great puzzles of the Rehnquist 
Court. Knowing what constitutional scholars knew in 1987/ 
there was every reason to expect that the Rehnquist Court 
would put separation of powers front and center in its constitu-
tional agenda. Word for word, separation of powers takes up 
more space in the Constitution than any other doctrine. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia were widely known to sym-
pathize with "original intent" principles of interpretation.8 More 
important, as this Article will show, the Burger Court had left 
the Rehnquist Court with several excellent originalist prece-
dents. Later, the Rehnquist Court would change the law of con-
stitutional federalism using the precedential equivalent of whole 
cloth.9 By contrast, at the beginning of the Rehnquist Court, the 
Court had all the precedents it needed to launch a sweeping 
revolution in separation of powers. 
risprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 490 (2<Xl2). 
6. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, 
INTEREST, AND MONEY 383-84 (1964 ). 
7. See, e.g., Symposium: Bowsher v. Synar, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 421 (1987). 
8. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989); 
William H. Rchnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976). 
9. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1955); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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Yet there was no revolution. 10 The Rehnquist Court has de-
clined several invitations to breathe more life into originalism 
through separation of powers law. In the process, the Court has 
continued a trend that has frustrated constitutional scholars for 
years, veering erratically between originalist and non-originalist 
interpretive methodologies with barely any explanation. 11 Did 
the Justices on the Burger Court take originalism seriously from 
the beginning? If not, why have the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts applied originalism at all? Many academics have criti-
cized the Burger and Rehnquist Courts for their inconsistency,12 
but no one has yet explained these Courts' track records con-
vincingly. 
This Article explains that puzzle. The Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts have used originalism and non-originalism selectively. 
Both Courts have chosen one or the other depending on which 
better promotes a theory of government this Article calls "the 
Progressive theory of apolitical administration." In simple form, 
this theory holds that government operates best when the Con-
stitution is construed to stop elected politicians from interfering 
with expert bureaucrats. Leading Progressive academics de-
duced this theory of government from a more comprehensive 
political theory of a living Constitution. During the New Deal, 
the theory of apolitical administration lost its overt associations 
with living Constitution theory and became widely accepted, in 
legal education and among leading public-law officials and prac-
titioners. 
A broad bloc on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts has con-
tinued to use the Progressive theory of apolitical administration 
to decide hard separation of powers cases. That bloc has used 
the theory to decide whether to apply an originalist methodology 
or a non-originalist one in separation of powers cases. Since 
methodology often decides results in constitutional cases, this 
10. SeeM. Elizabeth Magill, Separalion of Powers: The Revolwion lhal Wasn'l, 99 
Nw. U. L. REV. 47 (2004). 
11. My favorite expression of frustration comes from Gary Lawson, who com-
plained that the Court was "alternately raising and dashing the hopes ... of formalists ... 
who advocate strict adherence to the Constitution's particular tripartite structure." Gary 
Lawson, Terrilorial Governmenls and lhe Limils of Formalism, 78 CAL. L. REV. 853, 854 
(1990). He concludes that the functionalists won by TKO. See id. 
12. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separalion of Powers Juriprudence is so 
Abysmal, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 507 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Func-
lional Approaches 10 Separmion-of-Powers Queslions: A Foolish lnconsislency?, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987); Erwin Chemerinsky, A Paradox Wilhow a Principle: A 
Commem on lhe Burger Coun's Jurisprudence in Separalion of Powers Law, 60S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1083 (1987). 
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bloc has really used the Progressive theory of apolitical admini-
stration to decide the merits of separation of powers cases. This 
controlling bloc has been quite broad. Justice White was a con-
sistent non-originalist, while Justices Scalia and Thomas have 
been fairly consistent originalists. The other members of the 
Court, however, have mixed and matched the two approaches. 
This group has included Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stew-
art, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. More of-
ten than not, it included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall. It probably includes Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer. 
The Progressive theory of apolitical administration does not 
come into play in every case, but it strongly influences cases that 
test how administrative agencies relate to the three traditional 
departments of government. The clearest test cases began in 
1976 and continued through 1992. While the Court has not heard 
enough separation of powers cases in the last twelve years to say 
with certainty whether the theory continues to control, the avail-
able evidence suggests it does. Most of the time, the law under 
review promotes Progressive ideals by transferring power from 
the traditional three departments to an administrative agency. In 
such a case, the controlling bloc of Justices applies a deferential, 
non-originalist methodology called "New Deal functionalism" to 
uphold the administrative scheme. By contrast, when the law 
under challenge seems to flout the ideal of apolitical administra-
tion, alarm bells go off and the controlling bloc worries that 
Congress is trying to inject politics into administration. The Jus-
tices in this bloc then use originalism to declare the law unconsti-
tutional. 
This episode teaches two important lessons. The first relates 
to separation of powers. The Supreme Court does not take 
originalism nearly as seriously as scholars do. Although scholars 
disagree whether originalism is a desirable or workable approach 
to separation of powers, they do agree that, if the Court were to 
apply originalism consistently in separation of powers, it would 
need to invalidate most of the administrative state.13 In reality, 
however, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have used original-
ism in a manner that dedicated originalists would find per-
\3. See, e.g., Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Adminis-
trative State: Toward a Constitwional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 
11 (1994) ("There is, however, one overriding problem with formalism as a method for 
evaluating current structures. Under a pure formalist approach, most, if not all, of the 
administrative state is unconstitutional."). 
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verse-only when doing so bolsters the constitutional case for 
the administrative state. Not to put too fine a point on it, but the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts have paid attention to James 
Madison's opinions about separation of powers only when his 
views happen to dovetail with Frank Goodnow, Woodrow Wil-
son, and James Landis's plans for an independent and central-
ized national bureaucracy. 
The second lesson is relevant to retrospectives that have or 
will soon be written about the Rehnquist Court. 14 In one of the 
most important areas of constitutional law, a broad cross-section 
of Justices on the Burger and Rehnquist Court took their bear-
ings not from conservative political beliefs, not from original-
intent jurisprudential beliefs, but from Progressive-New Deal 
political theory. Somewhere in their education or practice, the 
Justices on these Courts learned to think that the best way to run 
a government was to establish centralized bureaucracies staffed 
by well-educated lawyers and public-policy specialists, and sub-
stantially free from meddling by politicians. If similar connec-
tions explain other areas of the Court's case law, that Court has 
been much less conservative and much more conventional than 
most academics assume. 
Before proceeding, let me briefly explain this Article's 
methodology. The Article is primarily descriptive. It is norma-
tive only to the extent that it uses a theory of government to de-
scribe and predict how the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have 
approached separation of powers cases. This interpretation 
could be described as "attitudinalist," in that it presumes that 
Justices decide cases primarily on the basis of political prefer-
ences shaped by Progressive political theory. 15 At the same time, 
this Article concentrates far more than attitudinalist studies usu-
ally do on how Justices may have formed their political prefer-
ences and attitudes. In addition, the Justices studied here could 
maintain with sincerity that they kept their political attitudes 
largely separate from their constitutional interpretation. The 
Progressive and functionalist ideas discussed throughout the Ar-
ticle could have convinced Justices that sound constitutional in-
terpretation can and should consider the substantive conse-
quences of different interpretations under consideration- in 
14. See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 5; Tushnet, supra note 3; Symposium, The Mak-
ing of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 561 
(2003). 
15. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). 
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which case they could appropriately have relied on the Progres-
sive theory of apolitical administration while interpreting the 
separation of powers provisions of the Constitution. While John 
McGinnis has explored a similar approach in his explication of 
the Rehnquist Court,16 legal scholars have not developed this 
genre of interpretation as systematically as have political scien-
tists who study the Supreme Court. Ronald Kahn has called this 
approach "constitutive," by which he means that overarching 
normative ideas "constitute" in Justices' minds overarching but 
distinct understandings of law, government, and legal interpreta-
tion.17 This genre of scholarship, however, now goes by the name 
"institutionalism."18 As Howard Gillman explains, institutional-
ists aim to describe the Supreme Court and other public institu-
tions by reconstructing "those bundles of ideas and motivations 
that are associated with particular institutions."19 They do so "in 
the hope that [they] can induce with some confidence the rea-
sons that led a particular course of conduct. "20 Stated in institu-
tionalist terms, then, this Article's thesis is that the Progressive 
theory of apolitical administration is an especially big stick in the 
bundle of ideas and motivations that inform the current Court's 
decision making in separation of powers cases. 
That said, the interpretation presented here may depart 
from institutionalist scholarship in one significant respect: By 
surveying the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' achievements in 
context of developments from the Progressive Era and the New 
Deal, this approach may paint with too broad a brush for many 
institutionalists. Institutionalists often prefer to describe motiva-
tions and intentions, in Gillman's words, "at a particular histori-
cal moment in a particular context."21 There are sound reasons 
to focus on narrow historical context. This Article illustrates the 
16. See McGinnis, supra note 5, at 498-99 (while it is "much too simple to say that 
the Supreme Court follows the election returns ... Justices pick up the outlines of broad 
social theories as they arc reflected in the media" or articulated by leading theorists). 
17. RONALD KAHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, 1953-
1993, at 4 (1994). 
18. See Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Inter-
pretive Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME 
COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 65 (Cornell W. Clay-
ton & Howard W. Gillman, eds. 1999). 
19. /d. at 78-79. 
20. /d. at 78. 
21. !d. at 79. See also Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, Beyond the lconograph 
of Order: Notes for a "New lnstit!llionalism," in THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS: APPROACHES & INTERPRETATIONS 311, 320 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Calvin 
Jillson cds., 1994) (''There is no escaping a description of 'the times' in the study of insti-
tutions."). 
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risk: One must be careful not to assume that Justices on the 
Court in the last 30 years have understood and applied the the-
ory of apolitical administration as Woodrow Wilson and other 
Progressives did. Progressives tended to understand that theory 
as one of several necessary implications of an encompassing He-
gelian, "living Constitution" theory of the state, while contempo-
rary lawyers and legal academics prefer to ground the theory in 
more technical and policy-oriented consequentialist claims. 
At the same time, there are also useful reasons to take a 
longer view than institutionalists typically prefer. The main rea-
son is a concern about interpretation. Contemporary separation 
of powers doctrine is hard to understand on its own terms, in 
large part because it is reconciling deep tensions between Pro-
gressive intentions, a constitutional design arguably inconsistent 
with those intentions, and pre-Progressive case law demonstra-
bly inconsistent with those intentions. To understand the inten-
tions behind current doctrine, it helps to start with the intentions 
of leading Progressives, which were quite clear, and then to in-
terpret current doctrine as an attempt to reconcile the Constitu-
tion and the case law with those intentions.22 This interpretive 
approach may in turn produce other benefits for constitutional 
scholarship if it bears fruit in subsequent studies of other areas 
of the Supreme Court's case law. It may contribute to the study 
of Supreme Court history, for its long view may help put the 
Rehnquist Court in sensible historical perspective in relation to 
the most important constitutional developments of the early 
twentieth century. Separately, the long view may provide useful 
examples to engage important issues in contemporary normative 
constitutional theory. The Rehnquist Court has opened up wide-
ranging debates about the merits of "original intent" and "living 
Constitution" approaches to constitutional interpretation.23 To 
appreciate the stakes of such debates, it is helpful to go back and 
find points of contact in theory and the case law between 
originalist and living-Constitution approaches to interpretation. 
In separation of powers law, that point of contact lies in the Pro-
gressive Era. 
22. I have explored a similar theme in relation to the Commerce Clause in Eric R. 
Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism in Progressive Polirical Theory and rhe 
Commerce Clause afrer Lopez and Morrison, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. 483 (2002). 
23. Compare, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266-68 
(lYYl) (proposing a historicist theory of constitutionalism in which the Constitution's 
meaning changes as a result of transformational "constitutional moments") wirh Scalia, 
supra note 8 (defending originalism). 
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I. THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, THE NEW DEAL, 
AND APOLITICAL ADMINISTRATION 
A. THE PROGRESSIVE THEORY OF APOLITICAL 
ADMINISTRATION 
Progressive political theory made a huge contribution to 
twentieth-century political practice by making popular and re-
spected the theory of apolitical administration. This theory filled 
what leading Progressive academics perceived to be a gap both 
in American political practice and in the canon of political the-
ory generally. For better or worse, both practice and theory had 
focused on questions about the ends of government to the exclu-
sion of questions about the means of government. To fill that 
gap, the Progressives proposed that American governments 
teach a class of professional experts the tools of social and politi-
cal control, insulate them from the ruckus of electoral and party 
politics, and then leave them rationally and efficiently to imple-
ment the legislative priorities that emerged from such politics. 
The basic critique was sketched out in a seminal1887 article 
by Woodrow Wilson- then a political scientist, and later a presi-
dent of Princeton, Governor of New Jersey, early leader of the 
Progressive wing of the Democratic Party, and ultimately Presi-
dent of the United States.24 Wilson ambitiously called "the sci-
ence of administration ... a birth of our own century, almost of 
our own generation" -and at the same time "the latest fruit of 
that study of the science of politics which was begun some 
twenty-two hundred years ago."25 After asking rhetorically 
where the new science administration could be found, he an-
swered, "Surely not on this side the sea," for "[t]he poisonous 
atmosphere of city government, the crooked secrets of state ad-
ministration, the confusion, sinecurism, and corruption ever and 
again discovered in the bureaux at Washington forbid us to be-
lieve that any clear conceptions of what constitutes good admini-
stration are as yet very widely current in the United States. "26 
24. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197 (1887). 
This section focuses on the thought or Frank Goodnow, Charles Evans Hughes, and 
Woodrow Wilson because they were leading figures and they restated principles gener-
ally accepted by Progressive academics and statesmen. For a close study or similar 
themes covering other Progressive thinkers, see Nathan D. Grundstein, Presidential 
Power, Administration and Administrative Law, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285 (1950). 
25. /d. at 198. 
26. /d. at 201. 
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Wilson turned away from American practice to the canon of 
political theory, and here too he noticed a gap. Most political 
theory to his day, he believed, had focused on questions of ends 
and regimes-what objects governments should undertake, and 
which forms of government were best-equipped to attain those 
objects. This canon had overlooked a different question, namely 
"how law should be administered with enlightenment, with eq-
uity, with speed, and without friction." This question of means, 
he complained, had been "put aside as 'practical detail' which 
clerks could arrange after doctors had agreed upon principles."27 
To remedy this problem, Wilson proposed a science of poli-
tics that grafted the administrative successes of European mon-
archies onto the politics of American democracy. Notwithstand-
ing their other defects, in monarchies, "administration has been 
organized to subserve the general weal with the simplicity and 
effectiveness vouchsafed only to the undertakings of a single 
will."28 By contrast, notwithstanding their other advantages, in 
democracies, "which entered upon a season of constitution-
making and popular reform before administration had received 
the impress of liberal princirle, administrative improvement has 
been tardy and half-done."2 Such a democracy "finds it exceed-
ingly difficult to close out [the constitution-making] business and 
open for the public a bureau of skilled economical administra-
tion."30 As of his time, democracies had been "more concerned 
to render government just and moderate than to make it facile, 
well-ordered, and effective."31 Wilson acknowledged, tacitly 
comparing the United States to Prussia, that "(i]t is better to be 
untrained and free than to be servile and systematic. Still there is 
no denying that it would be better yet to be both free in spirit 
and proficient in practice."32 As a result, Wilson concluded that 
"we have reached a time when administrative study and creation 
are imperatively necessary to the well-being of our governments 
saddled with the habits of a long period of constitution-
making."33 
Wilson and others concluded that the basic solution was to 
create a science of administration. Administration would take 
27. !d. at llJ8-lJY. 
28. !d. at 204. 
29. !d. at 205. 
30. !d. 
31. !d. at 206. 
32. !d. at 207. 
33. !d. at 206. 
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legislative priorities as a given, issued by the political, electoral, 
and legislative processes, and concentrate on achieving those 
priorities as rationally and efficiently as possible. The trick was 
to ensure that politics shape only the ends of administration-
without tainting or interfering with the means of administration. 
As Wilson explained, "[t]he problem is to make public opinion 
efficient without suffering it to be meddlesome. Directly exer-
cised, in the oversight of the daily details and in the choice of the 
daily means of government, public criticism is of course a clumsy 
nuisance, a rustic handling of delicate machinery. But as superin-
tending the greater forces of formative policy alike in politics 
and administration, public criticism is altogether safe and benefi-
cent, altogether indispensable."34 In short, "administration "lies 
outside the proper sphere of politics .... Although politics sets 
the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipu-
late its offices. "35 
The same themes came out later in the writings of Frank 
Goodnow, a professor of administrative law at Columbia and the 
first President of the American Political Science Association, the 
trade guild for the emerging discipline of political science.36 
Goodnow cited "American experience [as] conclusive" to prove 
that "in its extreme form [tripartite separation of powers] has 
been proven to be incapable of application to any concrete po-
litical organization."37 Goodnow believed instead that "political 
functions group themselves naturally under two heads, which are 
equally applicable to the mental operations and the actions of 
self-conscious personalities."38 In other words, "the action of the 
state as a political entity consists either in operations necessary 
to the expression of its will"-that is to say, politics-"or in op-
erations necessary to the execution of its will"-that is to say, 
administration.39 
As Goodnow's comments suggest, many leading Progres-
sives deduced the theory of apolitical administration from a 
more comprehensive "living Constitution" theory of political 
34. /d. at 215. 
35. /d. at 21!l. 
36. See Dennis J. Mahoney, A Newer Science of Politics: The Federalist and Ameri-
can Policical Science in the Progressive Era, in SAYING THE REVOLUTION: T/IE 
FEDERAUST PAPERS AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 250, 252 (Charles R. Kesler cd., 
1987). 
37. FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 13 (1900) (John A. 
Rohr intro., 2003). 
38. /d. at 9. 
39. /d. at 9. 
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philosophy. Goodnow distinguished between administration and 
politics because he likened the state, "abstractly considered," "to 
an organism," with "a social mind and a social will."40 Politics 
provided the will, administration supplied the mind. Similarly, 
Woodrow Wilson frequently called the American Constitution a 
"vehicle of life."41 
In any case, the Progressives drew several specific proposals 
from their understandings of the living Constitution and the the-
ory of apolitical administration. They sought to reorder enabling 
statutes and structural constitutional law to recognize the fun-
damental Progressive distinction between politics and admini-
stration. The Progressives had four main proposals. First, to dis-
charge Progressive theory's increased conception of social 
control, the country needed more administrators. Thus, Wood-
row Wilson foresaw in 1887 "a corps of civil servants prepared 
by special schooled and drilled, after appointment, into a per-
fected organization."42 Charles Evans Hughes, Governor of New 
York, Presidential candidate against Wilson, and Supreme Court 
Justice, observed: "The equipment of governmental departments 
or bureaus to aid in the enforcement of the laws has been a 
marked feature of recent legislation." "[I]n order that the bureau 
may accomplish the purpose of its creation," he explained, "the 
necessity of an enlarged force becomes apparent. "43 
Second, the Progressives demanded broader delegations. 
They expected bureaucratic agencies to assume the responsibil-
ity of generating substantive rules of conduct. Statutory law gets 
outdated quickly in the world of the living Constitution. As 
Elihu Root, a leading lawyer, U.S. Senator, and Cabinet Secre-
tary to two Republican Presidents, explained, "As any commu-
nity passes from simple to complex conditions the only way in 
which government can deal with the increased burdens thrown 
upon it is by the delegation of power to be exercised in detail by 
subordinate agents, subject to the control of general directions 
prescribed by superior authority. "44 Before Progressive agencies 
like the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade 
Commission, and state public utility agencies, Root noted, "the 
40. /d. at 8. 
41. WOODROW WILSON, CO:--ISTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
167-68 (1911 ). 
42. Wilson, supra note 24, at 216. 
43. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS IN DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNMENT 35 (1910, Arno Press 1974 reprint). 
44. ELIHU ROOT, ADDRESSES ON CITIZENSHIP AND GOVERNMENT 535 (1916). 
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old doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative power has 
virtually retired from the field and given up the fight."45 Of 
course, the Progressives did recognize, as Charles Evans Hughes 
did, that "in the unchecked discretion of legislatures and admin-
istrative officers lie opportunities of tyranny. "46 But as most Pro-
gressives did, Hughes judged it better to err on the side of action 
than inaction. "[T]here is no greater mistake," he warned, "than 
to withhold the power to do well in the fear of ill."47 
Third, the Progressives transferred adjudicative functions 
from courts and executive-branch departments to bureaucrats. 
The Progressives finessed possible constitutional objections by 
recognizing a new category of "quasi-judicial" administrative 
functions. As Frank Goodnow explained, judicial courts were 
not competent to apply law to facts in situations in which "such 
performance requires the possession of considerable technical 
knowledge."48 Separately, Goodnow regarded many some 
clearly executive functions as "quasi-judicial in character" be-
cause they "must be as impartial and free from prejudice as pos-
sible,"49 and require "wide information and varied knowledge," 
which "must in many instances be acquired by some governmen-
tal authority which is reasonably permanent in character. "50 
Last, and most important, the Progressives demanded that 
the bureaucrats be insulated from politics. For the Progressives, 
politics and administration were like oil and water. In Good-
now's diagnosis, while "[p ]opular government requires that ... 
[a ]dministration must ... be subjected to the control of poli-
tics, "51 it threatens to "hinder[] instead of aid[] the spontaneous 
expression of the public will, and hampers its efficient execu-
tion."52 Goodnow warned that "[p]olitical control over adminis-
trative functions is liable ... to produce inefficient administra-
tion in that it makes administrative officers feel that what is 
demanded of them is not so much work that will improve their 
own department, as compliance with the behests of the political 
45. /d. at 535 (1916). 
46. HUGHES, supra note 43, at 44. 
47. /d. at 44. 
48. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 37, at 75. 
49. /d. at 76. 
50. /d. at 76. 
51. fRANK 1. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES 7 (1905); accord GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra 
note 37, at 24. 
52. GOODNOW, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 51, at 8; accord 
GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 37, at37, 72. 
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party. "53 Of course, one might question whether administrators 
are as independent of party politics as Goodnow seems to have 
assumed. Nevertheless, if Woodrow Wilson is representative, the 
Progressives did not think there was a problem. Wilson was posi-
tive that administrators could recognize and implement the will 
American people independent of parties or other parochial in-
terests. He assumed it was possible to establish "a civil service 
cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor, 
and yet so intimately connected with the popular thought, by 
means of elections and public counsel, as to find arbitrariness or 
class spirit out of the question."54 
The Progressives assumed that two tools would insulate bu-
reaucrats from the political branches. One consisted of legal pro-
tections. To protect administrators from the executive, Good-
now proposed to give agency officers a legal "position 
reasonably permanent in character and reasonable free from po-
litical influence," including "considerable permanence of ten-
ure," similar to judicial tenure. 55 The Progressives also assumed 
that the bureaucracy would remain as free from Congress as they 
hoped to make it free from the President. Woodrow Wilson, for 
instance, scorned the possibility that "those who administer the 
law ... shall be in leading strings and shall be reduced to be the 
mere ministerial agents of a representative assembly."56 
The Progressives' other tool lay in public opinion. The Pro-
gressives hoped to educate public and elite opinion that admini-
stration was best kept separate from politics. Hughes proposed 
to attract the best and brightest to administrative service by "at-
tach[ing] to the office the degree of honour, which is commensu-
rate with the importance of the work to be performed. "57 Simi-
larly, Goodnow hoped to foster a "sound public opinion" toward 
the bureaucracies. At the end of the day, Goodnow concluded, 
the security provided by public opinion "is the only protection 
which can be offered to either the judicial or administrative au-
thorities against the exercise of political influences by bodies ... 
in the extra-governmental- political-system. "58 
53. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 37, at 82-83. See also 
HUGHES, supra note 43, at 34, 45-46. 
54. Wilson, supra note 24, at 217. 
55. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 37, at 86-87. 
56. WILSON, supra note 41, at 15. 
57. HUGHES, supra note 43, at 51. 
58. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 37, at 45. 
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B. NEW DEAL FUNCTIONALISM 
Law and public opinion worked together to convert the 
Progressives' blueprint for apolitical administration into reality. 
By the late New Deal, the opinions of legal elites and legal aca-
demics tracked the Progressives' agenda for administrative gov-
ernment. While this article cannot survey this New Deal trans-
formation in any comprehensive way, the highlights are 
reasonably clear and have been described by leading historians. 59 
To begin with, opinions changed in the law schools. For instance, 
as recalled by Louis Oberdorfer, one of Byron White's col-
leagues at Yale Law School, by 1939 the students were learning a 
Legal Realist catechism that held, among other things: 
4. Congressmen and legislators are crooks, fools, or both. 
5. The only proper way to allocate resources is to create an 
administrative agency- staffed by experts- such as former 
Professor Douglas or former Professor Fortas.60 
While Oberdorfer (later a federal judge) was almost certainly 
poking fun at his professors for their zealousness, it is just as 
clear that he learned the underlying Progressive message. 
Separation of powers law also changed in this period. In-
deed, most lawyers do not appreciate the extent to which the 
pre-1900 conception of separation of powers law had receded be-
fore the famous showdown between President Roosevelt and the 
Court from 1935 to 1937.61 The Court had loosened the nondele-
gation doctrine from 1900 through the early New Deal.62 In the 
59. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 1870-1960, at 169-246 (1992). 
60. DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON,THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE : A 
PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 153 (1998) (quoting Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer, 
''Remarks at the 25th Anniversary of Byron White's Appointment to the Supreme 
Court, April25, 1987). 
61. This is one of the valuable insights made by G. EDWARD WHITE, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 94-127 (2002). 
62. See, e.g., Fed. Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 
266 (1933) (rejecting a nondelegation challenge to a radio statute requiring the Federal 
Radio Commission to "make a fair and equitable allocation of licenses," "as public con-
venience, interest or necessity requires"); Avent v. United States, 266 U.S. 127 (1924) 
(upholding a transportation statute to prescribe rules to break emergency rules for rail-
roads when "reasonable" and "in the interest of the public and of commerce"); Buttfield 
v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904) (rejecting a nondelcgation challenge to a law making it 
illegal "to import or bring into the United States any merchandise as tea which is inferior 
in purity, quality, and fitness" in relation to standards for the same promulgated by the 
Secretary of the Treasury). 
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1932 case Crowell v. Benson,63 the Court legitimized the practice 
of allowing administrative agencies to conduct arguably Article 
III adjudications when it upheld against constitutional challenge 
large portions of a maritime workers'-compensation scheme. In 
the 1936 case, Humphrey's Executor v. United States,64 the Court 
upheld against an Article II challenge the constitutionality of 
FTC commissioners. The Court's decision handed President 
Roosevelt a significant political defeat, but to do so the Court 
wrote Frank Goodnow's constitutional theory of separation of 
powers into the U.S. Reports. The Court upheld the FTC's ena-
bling act on the ground that the FTC's commissioners exercised 
not "executive power in the constitutional sense," but "quasi-
legislative or quasi-judicial powers."65 
Of course, the New Deal Court also seemed to break with 
the Progressive blueprint when it endorsed the non-dele§ation 
doctrine in A. L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp- v. United States 6 and 
then again in Panama Oil Co. v. Ryan.6 Schechter Poultry and 
Panama Ryan were the first two cases in which the Supreme 
Court used the non-delegation doctrine to strike down acts of 
Congress.68 But in the context of Crowell, Humphrey's Executor, 
and especially the trend in nondelegation law, these two deci-
sions were extreme cases. Both considered challenges to the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act, in which Congress had given the 
President broad latitude to certify codes of fair competition for a 
wide range of American industries. Shortly after Panama Ryan 
and Schechter Poultry, the Court upheld other New Deal laws as 
against non-delegation challenges.69 In light of the deferential 
cases before and after, Schechter Poultry and Panama Ryan 
quickly came to be understood as standing for the proposition 
that Congress violates the non-delegation doctrine only when it 
gives the President a blank check over most of the economy in a 
single legislative act. 70 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
(2002). 
285 u.s. 22 (1932). 
295 u.s. 602 (1936). 
/d. at 628-29. 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 370 
69. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding a delegation 
authorizing "fair and equitable" price controls); National Broadcasting Co. v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding a delegation to issue broadcast licenses when do-
ing so promotes the "public interest, convenience, or necessity"). 
70. Accord GARY LAWSON, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 101-02 (3d ed. 2004). 
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These New Deal cases laid the basis for a new, non-
originalist narrative in separation of powers law. This narrative 
now goes by the name of "functionalism." To avoid confusing 
this specific narrative with the general category of functionalist 
interpretive theory, this article will refer to the narrative as 
"New Deal functionalism." 71 New Deal functionalism differed 
from the Progressive theory of apolitical administration in at 
least two respects. It did not appeal to overarching ideas about a 
"living Constitution" as the central idea from which specific 
separation of powers prescriptions emanated. In addition, it did 
not attack head-on pre-1900 understandings of separation of 
powers, as Frank Goodnow had when he concluded that tripar-
tite separation of powers "has been proven to be incagable of 
application to any concrete political organization," or as 
Woodrow Wilson had when he complained that the Framers had 
had "no clear analysis of the matter in their own thoughts" when 
they wrote the Constitution to implement Montequieu's ideas 
about separation of powers. 73 Rather, New Deal functionalism 
respected tripartite separation of powers in broad form and then 
made the law significantly more deferential and pro-
administration in the details. It converted separation of powers 
law from a fairly rulebound exercise into a process of balancing 
competing interests. The balance weighed interests depending 
on how well they accorded with the Progressive theory of apo-
litical administration. 
The transition is apparent in James Landis's 1938 book, The 
Administrative Process, an influential attempt by a leading aca-
demic to articulate the constitutional case for administrative 
agencies. Like the Progressives, Landis assumed that the object 
of constitutional interpretation was "to adapt governmental 
technique ... to modern needs."74 Like the Progressives, Landis 
also attributed the adaptation in the early twentieth century to 
such factors as "the growing interdependence of individuals," 
"[t]he rise of industrialism and the rise of democracy."75 Like the 
Progressives, Landis insisted that courts ought to defer to this 
71. For one useful restatement of general functionalist tenets, sec Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. Cf. REV. 225, 
229-35. For a more comprehensive defense of functionalism in separation of powers, sec 
Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth 
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984). 
72. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 37, at 13. 
73. WILSON, supra note 41, at 55. 
74. JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1 (1938). 
75. /d. at 7. 
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transformation out of a recognition of the "inadequacy of the ju-
dicial ... process[]."76 Unlike the Progressives, however, Landis 
did not deduce any of these prescriptions from a living Constitu-
tion or an organic national will. 77 Each prescription was a practi-
cal, technical, and superficially apolitical response to the exigen-
cies of regulating a national economy in an encompassing 
national democracy. 
II. POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION ON THE 
BURGER AND REHNQUIST COURTS 
A. BUCKLEY: COOPTING ORIGINAL-INTENT FORMALISM 
By the 1970s, this combination of Progressive ends and New 
Deal methodological means became widely accepted among most 
Justices, academics, and other leading public lawyers. New Deal 
functionalist methodology kept the Supreme Court's separation 
of powers law in accord with Progressive ends after the New 
Deal. For instance, in the 1958 case Wiener v. United States, the 
Court restated Humphrey's Executor to allow the President to 
fire "core" executive officers at will, but also to allow Congress 
to shield "administrative" or "quasi-judicial" executive officers 
from removal.78 The Supreme Court bucked the functionalist 
trend on occasion. In the 1952 decision Youngstown v. Sawyer, 
for example, the Court declared illegal an attempt by President 
Truman to seize U.S. steel mills under his powers as commander 
in chief without any specific statutory authorization. 79 Like Pa-
nama Oil and Schechter Poultry, however, Youngstown v. Saw-
yer could be read narrowly, for the proposition that the Court 
would invoke originalist separation of powers ideas only when 
necessary to stop the President from governing the entire U.S. 
economy without congressional supervision. 
However, in the 1970s, two important conditions changed: 
Activist conservative courts no longer represented a major 
threat to the Progressive blueprint for apolitical administration, 
and Congress became a threat in its own right. To appreciate 
76. !d. at 46. 
77. See Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Consricution of Change: Legal Funda-
menrality Wichout Legal Fundamenralism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 56 (1993) (expressing 
surpnse that "the progressive elaboratiOn of a theory of a changing constitution ... 
ground to a halt after 1937"). 
78. 357 u.s. 349 (1958). 
79. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). I thank Joel Goldstein for convincing me to consider 
Youngsrown v. Sawyer. 
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that new threat, consider the law challenged in the 1976 decision 
Buckley v. Valeo. 80 Buckley challenged the composition of the 
Federal Election Commission. Four of the eight officers were 
appointed by the leaders of the House and Senate, and the Sec-
retary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House held two more 
seats ex officio.81 Politically, the FEC scheme represented an im-
portant precedent against the separation of politics and admini-
stration. The FEC enjoyed the full panoply of powers tradition-
ally enjoyed by administrative agencies-the powers to make 
legislative rules, prosecute violations of its organic statute and 
rules, and adjudicate those prosecutions, subject to limited judi-
cial review.82 If Congress could appoint the FEC's officers, there 
was no principled reason why Congress could not assume the 
power to appoint every other agency's officers. 
The FEC Act forced the Court to make a choice between 
political ends and interpretive means. One easy way to invalidate 
the Act was to revive originalist principles of interpretation in 
separation of powers law. But the Court could not do so without 
reopening the many questions about judicial activism and judi-
cial review that the New Deal had settled. On the other hand, if 
the Court applied New Deal functionalism, it would have been 
extremely difficult for the Court to invalidate a law in which 
Congress was asserting its political will over an administrative 
agency. 
The Court sided with Progressive government theory. In 
Buckley, the Court invalidated the FEC Act by resuscitating 
originalism-or, as the rest of this Article will describe it, "origi-
nal intent formalism." This approach is "formalistic" because, as 
Thomas Merrill explains, it "insists that the structural provisions 
of the Constitution establish a set of rules-an 'instruction man-
ual'- that must be followed whatever the consequences. "83 This 
formalism is an "original-intent" formalism because the original 
meaning of the Constitution supplies the instructions in that so-
called manual. In Buckley, the Court appealed to original mean-
ing by insisting that "[t]he principle of separation of powers was 
not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Fram-
ers: it was woven into the document that they drafted in Phila-
80. 424 u.s. 1 (1976). 
81. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 113. 
82. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 111-112. 
83. Merrill, supra note 71, at 230 (quoting Gary Lawson, In Praise of Woodenness, 
11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 21, 22 (1988)). 
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delphia in the summer of 1787. "84 Read formalistically, since the 
appointments clause specifically authorizes only the President, 
the heads of departments, and the courts of law to appoint offi-
cers, it implicitly withholds that power from Congress.85 The 
Court acknowledged that Congress might have "had good rea-
son for not vesting in a Commission composed wholly of Presi-
dential appointees the authority to administer the act," but it 
formalistically insisted that any such reasons "do not by them-
selves warrant a distortion of the Framers' work."86 
As these quotations suggest, at a superficial level Buckley's 
holding seems not to rely on policy at all. Below the surface, 
however, the decision relies heavily on Progressive norms about 
apolitical expertise. Buckley's holding created tensions with such 
separation of powers precedents as Crowell and Humphrey's Ex-
ecutor. Again, the FEC's commissioners exercised standard 
agency rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative powers. Since 
the Court expressed keen interest in what the Framers had said 
about the appointments clause issue, perhaps the Court might 
also have considered what the Framers had said about modern 
administrators. Publius, after all, had assumed in passing that the 
notion of indeJ?endent, non-partisan administration was a "po-
litical heresy." He declared emphatically that the combination 
of government functions in one officer is "the very definition of 
tyranny."88 The Court did not appeal to Publius's authority on 
these points, however. The Court held that the FEC's rulemak-
ing, prosecutorial, and adjudicative powers were innocuous, "of 
kinds usually performed by independent regulatory agencies."89 
Such powers, the Court suggested, were best "exercised free 
from day-to-day supervision of either Congress or the Executive 
Branch," and "essential to effective and impartial administration 
of the entire substantive framework of the Act."90 
84. Buckley,424 U.S. at 124. 
85. See U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125-26. 
86. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 134. 
87. See THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 379, 382 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. & 
Charles R. Kesler intro., 1999); see also Charles R. Kesler, Separation of Powers and the 
Administrative State, in THE IMPERIAL CONGRESS 20, 23-31 (Gordon Jones & John 
Marini eds., 1989). 
88. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 87, at 268, 269 (Madison). 
89. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140-41. 
90. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140-41. 
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B. PROGRESSIVE THEORY AND ARTICLE III 
Buckley's distinction gradually hardened throughout the 
rest of the Burger Court and the early years of the Rehnquist 
Court. It surfaced next in a series of cases about the relationship 
between Article III courts and administrative agencies. A Court 
plurality embraced original-intent formalism in Northern Pipe-
line Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.91 In Northern 
Pipeline, the Court invalidated provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1978 that vested the power to hear bankruptcy cases and re-
lated state lawsuits in bankruptcy courts staffed by judges who 
lacked Article III tenure or salary guarantees.92 Northern Pipe-
line did not directly threaten the Progressive blueprint of apoliti-
cal administration. The bankruptcy provisions at issue threat-
ened the Article III judiciary's integrity, because they 
transferred arguably Article III business to non-Article III 
judges.93 Even so, Northern Pipeline threatened to upset that 
Progressive blueprint indirectly. If the Court had applied the 
plurality's rule of decision to any scheme providing for adminis-
trative adjudication, it would have needed to discredit Crowell 
and declare the scheme unconstitutional. 
The Court thus hastened to limit Northern Pipeline in sub-
sequent cases involving agency adjudication. In Thomas v. Union 
Carbide,94 the Court considered a challenge to a law authorizing 
the EPA to order binding arbitration in proceedings meant to 
compensate ~esticide makers for compelled disclosure of their 
trade secrets. 5 Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor declined 
to strike the scheme down. If the Court invalidated the arbitra-
tion scheme, she worried, "the constitutionality of many quasi-
adjudicative activities carried on by administrative agencies in-
volving claims between individuals would be thrown into 
doubt."96 
Justice O'Connor reaffirmed New Deal functionalism in 
CFTC v. Schor.97 In Schor, the Court upheld a scheme authoriz-
ing Commodities Futures Trading Corporation administrative 
91. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.). 
92. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53-54 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) 
93. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.). 
94. 473 U.S. 568 (1985). 
95. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 573. 
96. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, 
and Powell joined O'Connor in Thomas. Justice Stevens concurred separately to decide 
the case on a waiver issue; Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall concurred sepa-
rately to distinguish the case more narrowly from Northern Pipeline. 
97. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
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law judges ("ALJs") to adjudicate suits and state-law counter-
claims arising from the violation of Commodities Exchange Act 
regulations. Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor framed 
Schor's Article III challenge as a balance of competing policy in-
terests. O'Connor then gave the competing interests the weights 
specified in Progressive political theory. She deferred heavily to 
the purpose of the law, "to create an inexpensive and expedi-
tious alternative forum through which customers could enforce 
the provisions of the CEA. "98 She placed great weight on avoid-
ing the possibility that the Court might "unduly constrict Con-
gress' ability to take needed and innovative action."99 On the 
other side, O'Connor did not worry that the Commission's ALJs 
might be more political than juries and state and Article III 
courts. She took at face value a claim in a congressional report 
that "the CFfC was relative!~ immune from political pressure 
and [had] obvious expertise."' 0 
C. PROGRESSIVE THEORY IN ARTICLE I 
The formalist revival erupted next in Article I. The 1983 
case of INS v. Chadha 101 challenged a "legislative veto" provi-
sion. The Immigration and Naturalization Act gave the Attorney 
General power to suspend the deportations of aliens not lawfully 
in the United States if the aliens satisfied certain criteria, but it 
also reserved to each house of Congress the power to reverse 
such suspensions and thereby to reinstate the deportations. 102 
Like the appointments scheme challenged in Buckley, the legis-
lative veto directly threatened the ideal of apolitical administra-
tion. Policymaking was apolitical as long as Congress delegated 
regulatory powers to agencies and then left the agency to make 
the final decision. Policymaking became political, however, if 
Congress kept a veto hanging over the agency's decision. 
Nevertheless, the Court declared the legislative veto uncon-
stitutional because it threatened the ideal of apolitical admini-
stration. A solid majorit¥ of the Court embraced an original-
intent formalist analysis.' 3 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice 
98. !d. at 855. 
99. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851. 
100. /d. at 855-56 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-975, pp. 44,70 (1974)). 
101. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
102. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 924-25. 
103. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor joined Chief 
Justice Burger's opinion for the Court. Justice Powell concurred separately to decide the 
case on Article III grounds. See id. at 959 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice White dis-
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Burger reasoned that the veto of an agency action counted as an 
exercise of "legislative Power" under Article I. This legislative 
act, however, was not endorsed by the President or both Houses 
of Con~ress, as required by the presentment and bicameralism 
clauses. 04 Chief Justice Burger brushed aside functionalist policy 
arguments for the veto: "[T)he fact that a given law or procedure 
is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of 
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the 
Constitution." 105 As had the per curiam Court opinion in Buck-
ley, Burger's majority opinion in Chadha stressed what one 
Framer had called the "'danger of a Legislative despotism."' 106 
Burger cited The Federalist for the principle that bicameralism 
and presentment "establish[) a salutary check upon the legisla-
tive body, calculated to guard the community against the effects 
of faction,grecipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the pub-
lic good." 1 Chadha was especially telling because the legislative 
veto was not a constitutional novelty. As the Court noted, as of 
1983 Congress had inserted nearly 300 legislative-veto provisions 
into administrative statutes, many during the New Deal.108 If the 
Court's separation of powers law had been motivated by the in-
tention not to disturb administrative institutions with a solid 
pedigree in history and practice, the Court should have upheld 
the legislative veto. 
Chadha could plausibly have been read to signal that the 
Court would embrace formalism and broadly throughout separa-
tion of powers law. The simplest way to test this view was to ask 
whether the Court would start applying the interpretive ap-
proach of Chadha, a formalist Article I case, to the main Article 
I doctrine, the nondelegation doctrine. Tellingly, Chadha itself 
scntcd on New Deal functionalist grounds, arguing that the legislative veto represented a 
sound response to the problems created by broad administrative delegations. See id. at 
967 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist Uoined by Justice White) agreed with the 
Court's analysis of the legislative veto but concluded it required the Court to declare not 
only the veto but the entire deportation scheme unconstitutional. See id. at 1013 
(Rchnquist, J ., dissenting). 
104. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 7; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951-59. 
105. Chadha, 462 U.S. at944. 
106. !d. at 949 (quoting 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 254 (quoting James Wilson)); see also id. at 949-50 (quoting 
Alexander Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 and Joseph Story in COMMENTARIES 
ON THE CONSTITUTION). 
107. !d. at948 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at458 (Hamilton)). 
108. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944-45 (quoting James Abouresk, The Congressional 
Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 
52 IND. L. REV. 323, 324 (1977), and citing Justice White's list of the acts implicated in 
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1!Kl3-13 (White, J., dissenting)). 
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discouraged this approach-on the authority of the Progressive 
theory of apolitical administration. In Chadha, Congress had 
made a plausible nondelegation argument in its brief. By the 
Court's own formalistic definition of "legislative power," Con-
gress argued, the power to suspend deportations was just as "leg-
islative" as the power to veto the suspension. If the Court were 
set on formalism, it would need to explain why the Attorney 
General, an executive officer, could exercise legislative power 
without raising nondelegation problems. Not so, held the Court. 
That question raised "only a question of delegation doctrine," 
and "Congress' authority to delegate portions of its power to 
administrative agencies provides no support for the argument 
that Congress can constitutionally control administration of the 
laws by way of a congressional veto." 109 
As the evidence rolled in after Chadha, it became clear that 
the Court still subscribed to the New Deal's functionalist rendi-
tion of nondelegation doctrine. The clearest sign of the trend 
came in the 1989 decision Mistretta v. United States, 110 which up-
held the U.S. Sentencing Commission's powers to promulgate 
legislative formulas for federal district courts to follow in crimi-
nal sentencings. Unlike the legislative veto, the Sentencing 
Commission was a constitutional novelty in an important re-
spect. The standard-issue administrative agency makes legisla-
tive rules on behalf of or in place of the President; the Sentenc-
ing Commission promulgates such rules for Article III courts. 
That difference made the Commission enough of a constitutional 
sport for the Court to attack the Commission if it so desired. 
Nevertheless, in the Court's mind, Congress's delegation to the 
Commission raised essentially the same policy issues as any 
other delegation to any other agency. 111 Thus, in a majority opin-
ion joined by everyone except Justice Scalia, Justice Blackmun 
restated nondelegation doctrine in classic New Deal functionalist 
terms. Blackmun distinguished Chadha on legislative-usurpation 
grounds, recognizing that Congress may not "exercise the re-
sponsibilities of other Branches or ... reassign powers vested by 
the Constitution." 112 In all other cases, however, Mistretta sig-
naled that courts should uphold delegations as long as "Congress 
109. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953-54 n.l6. 
110. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
Ill. See id. at 371 (calling the Commission "an independent Sentencing Commis-
sion"). I am grateful to John Duffy for insisting that I highlight the contrast between the 
legislative veto in Chadha and the Sentencing Commssion in Mistretta. 
112. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382. 
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clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is 
to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority. "113 
As Justice O'Connor had in Thomas and Schor, Justice 
Blackmun balanced the competing policy interests in Mistretta 
with Progressive eyes and thumbs. Since Chadha had cited The 
Federalist Papers as controlling authority, perhaps Mistretta 
could have taken judicial notice that Publius had defined "law" 
as "a rule of action" and asked rhetorically, "how can that be a 
rule, which is little known, and less fixed?" 114 In Mistretta, how-
ever, Justice Blackmun cited Progressive policy arguments as au-
thoritative. The nondelegation doctrine, he explained, "has been 
driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly com-
plex society, replete with ever changing and more technical 
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to 
delegate power under broad general directives." 115 Since the 
Commission gave the judiciary power over both rulemaking and 
rule application in sentencing, perhaps Justice Blackmun could 
have considered Publius's and Montesquieu's warning that 
"there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive 
powers are united in the same person, or body ofmagistrates."116 
Justice Blackmun declined, stating that the Court has often "up-
held statutory provisions that to some extent commingle the 
functions of the Branches." 117 
D. PROGRESSIVE THEORY AND ARTICLE II 
The Burger and early Rehnquist Courts also applied New 
Deal functionalism and original-intent formalism selectively in 
Article II removal cases. Removal law had settled in a function-
113. /d. at 372-73. Justice Scalia dissented on the formalist ground that the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines scheme unconstitutionally authorized judicial officials to make legislative 
rules outside of the course of exercising their Article Ill "judicial power" to decide cases. 
See id. at 416-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, Scalia did reject Mistretta's nondelega-
tion challenge. Scalia disagreed with the majority because he thought there does exist a 
non-delegation doctrine, but he thought it a doctrine "not readily enforceable by the 
courts." /d. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's opinion is revealing because it shows 
that he is sometimes more attached to a functionalist theory of judicial minimalism than 
he is to original-intent interpretation. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of 
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). These tensions go beyond the scope of this article; 
I have explored them in relation to Scalia's takings jurisprudence in Eric R. Claeys, Tak-
ings and Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 187,220-29 (2004). 
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, supra note 87, at 344,349 (Madison). 
115. /d. at 372. 
116. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 87, at 270 (Madison) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
117. /d. 
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alist pattern after Humphrey's Executor in 1935 and Wiener in 
1958, but the Burger Court unsettled it in Bowsher v. Synar. 118 
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act as-
signed the removal power to Congress, not the President. The 
relevant provisions required the Comptroller General to deter-
mine whether the federal budget deficit exceeded statutory tar-
gets and what budget cuts would reduce the deficit beneath the 
target. The Comptroller General's determinations triggered 
automatic se9uestrations unless Congress made equivalent 
spending cuts. 19 Unlike the agency officers at issue in Hum-
phrey's Executor and Wiener, the Comptroller is removable by a 
joint resolution of Congress. 120 Although the Comptroller does 
have "good cause" protections similar to those protecting agency 
commissioners and administrators,121 the Court pointedly noted 
that Congress was not willing to concede during the Bowsher 
litigation that these 5ood-cause provisions were enforceable in 
an Article III court. 2 The most important feature of the Act 
was that Congress, and not the President, was exercising the re-
moval power. 
The Balanced Budget Act created a threatening precedent 
for apolitical administration. While the Comptroller General is 
not an ordinary administrator, the Comptroller's responsibility 
to prepare binding budget estimates was executive, like the 
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions of many agencies. 123 If 
Congress could constitutionally arrogate the power to fire the 
Comptroller, it could cite the Balanced Budget Act as precedent 
for rewriting many agency enabling statutes to assume for itself 
the power to fire agency officers. 
The Court thus switched to original-intent formalism. (Bow-
sher was particularly ironic because it was handed down on the 
same day as the very functionalist Schor decision, discussed 
above in part II.C. 124) Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Bur-
ger invalidated the challenged provisions of the Balanced 
Budget Act on formalist grounds. "Congressional control over 
118. 478 u.s. 714 (1986). 
119. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 718. 
120. See id. 478 U.S. at 728. 
121. Seeid. (citing31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)(B)). 
122. !d. 
123. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-34. 
124. July 7, 1986. Compare id. at 714 with CITC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). Chief 
Justice Burger and Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Rehnquist joined both majority opin-
wns, and Justice Stevens JOined the Court's functionalist opinion in Schor and wrote a 
separate formalist concurrence in Bowsher. 
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the execution of the laws," the Burger insisted, "is constitution-
ally impermissible." 125 The Court also appealed to original in-
tent. It quoted the warning from Publius and Montesquieu that it 
would disregard a few years later in Mistretta, that '"there can be 
no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united 
in the same person, or body of magistrates.'" 126 Because this 
overriding threat to liberty was coming from Congress rather 
than from an agency, the Court applied the standard formalist 
syllogism: Congress's control over the tenure of the Comptroller 
General made the Comptroller a legislative official; the Comp-
troller's balanced-budget responsibilities were executive; and 
therefore, because the official was not performing the functions 
of his branch, the relevant portions of the Act violated the sepa-
ration of powers. 127 
The Court reversed course and limited Bowsher's reach a 
few years later in Morrison v. Olson. 128 Morrison rejected a chal-
lenge to the provisions of the Ethics in Government Act estab-
lishing the Office of Independent Counsel, which protected in-
dependent counsels from removal except for good cause.129 
Morrison, however, was not a test case of the Progressive theory 
of apolitical administration. The Independent Counsel's prose-
cutorial powers were clearly "core executive" powers, not ad-
ministrative, "quasi-judicial" powers. Perhaps the Court was mo-
tivated by concerns similar to the concerns that motivated 
Panama Oil, Schechter Poultry, and Youngstown v. Sawyer: here, 
a desire that no future President hold himself above the law as 
President Nixon had when he fired the special counsel investi-
gating Watergate. 130 Perhaps, as Michael Rappaport speculates, 
Morrison was decided as it was "because elite liberal opinion 
and some of the general public regarded the independent coun-
sel as essential to good government." 131 Even so, Morrison con-
125. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726-27. 
126. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722. 
127. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727-34. Chief Justice Burger wrote the Court opinion 
for himself and Justices Brennan, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justices Stevens and 
Marshall concurred separately to decide the case on a different formalist ground, that the 
Comptroller General could not rescind funds without Congress's following the bicam-
eralism and presentment clauses. See id. at 736 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justices White, 
see id. at 759 (White, J., dissenting), and Blackmun, see id. at 776 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) dissented separately to uphold the balanced-budget act on New Deal functionalist 
grounds. 
128. 487 u.s. 654 (1988). 
129. See id. at 663-64 (citing 28 U.S. C. 596). 
130. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
131. Michael B. Rappaport, It's the O'Connor Court: A Brief Discussion of Some 
Critiques of the Rehnquist Court and Their Implications for Administrative Law, 99 Nw. 
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firmed what Bowsher had already made apparent, that a broad 
bloc on the Court was alternating between formalist and func-
tionalist methodologies for substantive reasons. 
E. PROGRESSIVE THEORY ON THE REHNQUIST COURT 
By 1989, after Morrison and Mistretta, it was clear that a 
substantial majority on the Court had channeled the formalist 
revival to apply mainly when Congress threatened to exert po-
litical control over administrative agencies. The Rehnquist 
Court's separation of powers cases have followed this pattern 
since Morrison and Mistretta, especially in the few cases that 
touch on the Progressive norm of apolitical administration. Most 
of these cases are nondelegation opinions, all of which follow the 
New Deal functionalist pattern. 132 The most recent, Whitman v. 
American Trucking Association, 133 confirms that Mistretta is still 
the dominant nondelegation case of the last twenty years. 134 
The Rehnquist Court has decided other separation of pow-
ers cases that do not directly relate to the Progressive theory of 
apolitical administration. In Clinton v. New York, 135 the Court 
invalidated provisions of the Line Item Veto Act giving the 
President the power to use his judgment to cancel enacted 
spending appropriations. Clinton is a hard case to classify, be-
cause it forced Justices to decide between two competing at-
tachments. The Court majority probably decided the case in the 
same vein as Panama Oil, Schechter Poultry, 136 and Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 137 As those cases used originalist 
non-delegation law to stop the President from exercising un-
trammeled power over the entire U.S. economy, perhaps Clinton 
v. New York used them to stop the President from exercising un-
trammeled power over the entire U.S. federal budget. Justices 
Scalia, O'Connor, and Breyer dissented in Clinton, on the 
ground that the Court's holding threatened to resuscitate the 
non-delegation doctrine. 138 Breyer and O'Connor probably voted 
U. L. REV. 369, 381 (2004). 
132. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996); Touby v. United States, 500 
U.S. 160 (1991); Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989). 
133. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). Justice Thomas concurred in Whitman to signal his interest 
in reconsidering whether the Court's nondelegation doctrine is correct, but no one else 
joined this original-intent concurrence. 
134. Consider Gary Lawson's interpretation of the case, supra note 68, at 328-29. 
135. 524 u.s. 417 (1998). 
136. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
137. 343 u.s. 579 (1952). 
138. Cite Clinton Steven Calabresi and Michael Rappaport agree with Breyer, 
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as they did because they support wide delegations on Progres-
sive and functionalist grounds; Scalia voted with them because 
he opposes judge-made all-the-circumstances tests and the non-
delegation doctrine requires such a test. 139 
Separately, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, a six-vote majority 
of the Rehnquist Court struck down a federal securities law that 
required the federal courts to reopen final judgments entered 
before the law's enactment and to apply new and retroactive 
rules to the reopened cases. 140 Plaut falls in the same line as the 
reasoning of the Northern Pipeline plurality: Both used formal-
ism to stop Congress from threatening what every Justice except 
Justice Stevens agreed was a threat to the autonomy and long-
range interests of the Article III courts. 
The Rehnquist Court has handed down several opinions in 
appointments clause cases. One is clearly formalist, 141 while 
three opinions are hard to classify as formalist or functionalist. 142 
These decisions, however, are all rather peripheral in relation to 
the themes considered in this article. None challenged the consti-
tutional status of an administrative law judge who has not been 
appointed directly by the President, an agency head, or a court. 
When such a challenge arises, the judge in question may lose his 
job under Buckley. If Buckley controls, that unlucky administra-
tive job will lose his job.143 But then again, if the Court follows its 
track record over the last 30 years, surely it will limit Buckley as 
Thomas limited Northern Pipeline, non-delegation cases have 
limited Chadha, and Morrison limited Bowsher. 144 
O'Connor, and Scalia that Clinton raises important non-delegation questions-they are 
enthusiastic about the decision for that reason. See Steven G. Calabresi, Separation of 
Powers and the Centrality of Clinton v. City of New York, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 77 (2004), 
and Michael Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A 
New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City of 
New York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265 (2001). 
139. See supra note 113. 
140. 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
141. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997) (using a bright-line formalist 
test to hold military judges on the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals to be inferior 
officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause). 
142. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994) (holding that commissioned 
military officers do not need to be re-appointed consistent with the Appointments Clause 
to serve as military trial judges); Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 
868 (1991) (holding the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to be a "Court of Law" competent 
to appoint inferior officers under the Appointments Clause); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654 (1988) (holding the independent counsel to be an inferior officer and not a principal 
officer within the meaning of the Appointments Clause). 
143. See supra part II.B. 
144. The D.C. Circuit anticipated the suggestion in text in Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 
1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000), when it upheld the constitutionality of an FDIC ALJ appointment 
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The last Rehnquist Court separation of powers case, how-
ever, confirms that a broad bloc on the Rehnquist Court contin-
ues to rely on Progressive theory to decide the separation of 
powers cases that directly threaten administrative agencies. 145 In 
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the 
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Congress established a review 
board, composed of members of Congress, to oversee the com-
mission that supervised Dulles and National Airports near 
Washington, D.C. This commission was composed of federal, 
state, and District of Columbia officials, but the Court likened it 
to an ordinary federal agency. In his opinion for the Court, Jus-
tice Stevens called it a "non-political, independent authority." 146 
The enabling statute allowed Congressmen sit in review and 
management of the airport commission's functions. 147 
Stevens relied on Progressive administrative theory more 
explicitly than any other case considered thus far. Stevens chose 
to apply original-intent formalism precisely because the MW AA 
scheme threatened to compromise agency autonomy. He offered 
an example: If the act under challenge were not invalidated, he 
worried, it would "enable [Congress] or its agents to retain con-
trol, outside the ordinary legislative process, of the activities of 
state grant recipients char~ed with executing virtually every as-
pect of national policy." 14 To prevent this possibility, Stevens 
applied Chadha and Bowsher in the alternative. If the review 
board's functions were legislative, its structure violated Chadha 
because the board did not follow bicameralism and presentment; 
if those functions were executive, the board's structure violated 
Bowsher because members of Congress could not perform ex-
ecutive functions. Justice Stevens thus used original-intent for-
malism to stop an act from "provid[ing] a blueprint for extensive 
expansion of the legislative power beyond its constitutionally 
confined role." 149 
by construing Buckley's test for distinguishing between "officers" and "employees" so 
narrowly that the AU was a mere employee, outside the coverage of the appointments 
clause. 
145. 501 U.S. 252,257,260-61 (1991). 
146. Seeid. at274-76. 
147. !d. at 275. 
148. !d. at 277. 
149. /d. Justice Stevens wrote the Court opinion for himself and Justices Blackmun 
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter. Justice White, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Jus: 
lice Marshall dissented on New Deal functionalist grounds. 
434 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:405 
III. ALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS OF SEPARATION 
OF POWERS LAW ON THE BURGER AND 
REHNQUIST COURTS 
This account may not explain the specific beliefs and behav-
ior of every Justice on the Court, and it may not explain stray 
cases like Clinton v. City of New York or Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm. All the same, it does explain how the late Burger Court 
and the Rehnquist Court have behaved as groups. In addition, 
different Justices could have seen the issues differently and still 
contributed to the same overarching pattern. If one judges Chief 
Justice Burger by his opinions in Chadha and Bowsher, he 
seemed to believe there was no contradiction whatsoever be-
tween the Court's New Deal functionalist and its original-intent 
formalist cases. 150 If one parses Justice Stevens' Court opinion in 
Washington Airports, he seems quite aware he is using original-
intent formalism to dispose of the law while he is using Progres-
sive ideas about administration to settle the merits. At the other 
extreme, it is reported that then-Justice Rehnquist authored the 
separation of powers sections of the Court's per curiam opinion 
in Buckley. 151 While an Associate Justice, Rehnquist wrote other 
opinions unusually sympathetic to original-intent formalism. 152 
Perhaps Rehnquist did not take Progressive ideas about apoliti-
cal administration as seriously as his colleagues. Perhaps he used 
them in Buckley to convince his colleagues to join an otherwise 
strikingly formalist and novel opinion, and bowed to the inevita-
ble later as Chief Justice, when it became clear that no one ex-
cept Justice Scalia was interested in applying original-intent for-
malism on a consistent basis. Yet even if different Justices took 
different views about the Progressive theory of apolitical admini-
stration, all behaved as if this theory commanded the respect of 
most of the Justices on the Court. 
When it applies, this indirect Progressive connection may 
provide the most accurate description and predictor of the Su-
preme Court's separation of powers decisions to date. One al-
150. Justice Kennedy's Court opinion in Loving v. United States suggests he may 
view separation of powers as harmoniously as Chief Justice Burger did. See 517 U.S. 748, 
757-58 (1996) (declaring, in a nondelegation case doing nothing to reconsider the defer-
ence in the Court's nondelegation law, "By allocating specific powers and responsibilities 
to a branch fitted to the task, the Framers created a National Government that is both 
effective and accountable."). 
151. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 396 (1979) 
152. For example, Rehnquist proposed to revitalize the nondelegation doctrine in a 
concurring opinion in Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Amer. Petroleum lnst., 448 U.S. 
607 (1980). 
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ternative, suggested most prominently by Thomas Merrill, holds 
that the Court has pursued a program of judicial restraint. While 
Merrill proposed this thesis as an inductive, post hoc rationaliza-
tion of the Court's work and disclaimed any intention to propose 
it as a positive explanation, it still deserves consideration as a 
positive explanation. 153 According to this explanation, moderate 
or conservative Justices may feel a tension between originalism 
and judicial restraint. While they may be sympathetic to original-
ism generally, they prefer not to use originalism to invalidate 
acts of Congress unless the constitutional provisions at issue are 
unmistakably clear. 154 This explanation certainly comports with 
what we know about many of the Justices in the controlling 
bloc-at a minimum, Stewart, Burger, Blackmun, Powell, 
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, and Kennedy. During the rele-
vant time frame, these Justices tended to be soft originalists, 
comfortable conducting aggressive judicial review only when 
constitutional text gave them a bright-line constitutional test. 155 
At the same time, this originalist/judicial-restraint explana-
tion cannot explain all of the features of the controlling bloc's 
behavior. When laws threatened the idea of apolitical admini-
stration, these Justices were much more activist than the judicial-
restraint hypothesis suggests. In particular, these Justices were 
willing to enforce in quite activist fashion Article I, II, and III's 
vesting clauses, which are ~uite open-ended and indeterminate 
as constitutional clauses go 56 -even if they would have shied 
away from enforcing the same language in nondelegation cases 
and other cases reinforcing the apolitical administrative model. 
Chadha illustrates. The majority decided the case under the 
rather specific bicameralism and presentment clauses. To do so, 
however, the Court first needed to find that the legislative veto 
was an exercise of legislative power. Chief Justice Burger shoe-
horned the power to suspend the deportation of aliens into the 
153. See Merrill, supra note 71, at 228. 
154. See id. at 250. I am grateful to Joel Goldstein for persuading me to consider this 
possibility. 
155. See Young, supra note 2 at 625-42. 
156. For example, Adrian Vermeule and Eric Posner have made a not-implausible 
argument that the term. "legislative power" in Article l's vesting clause sanctions any 
grant of statutory authonty from Congress to the President. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002). Origi-
nal-meamng scholars have contested this view. See Lawson, supra note 68; Larry Alex-
ander & Sa1knshna Prakash, Reports of the Non-delegation Doctrine's Death Are Greatly 
Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 129? (2003). Even so, Vermeu1e and Posner's interpreta-
tiOn IS hard to refute If one starts With a presumption against constraining constitutional 
clauses broadly absent clear proof to the contrary. 
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"legislative Power" when exercised by Congress-even though 
he called the same power "executive" when exercised by the At-
torney General. 157 (For good measure, Justice Powell concurred 
separately to shoehorn the veto into the open-ended judiciary 
vesting clause, on the ground that the reversal of the Attorney 
General's suspension was inherently "judicial. "158) In short, Pro-
gressive ideas about apolitical administration seem to have en-
couraged Justices to be confident enough to be activist when 
constitutional text could not. 
Another alternative explanation holds that the Court shifts 
between methodologies to divide government and protect indi-
vidual freedom. Thomas Merrill and Elizabeth Magill have con-
sidered this possibility (although, as with the previous possibility, 
both raise it conceptually and normatively but not descrip-
tively).159 In a recent article, Magill argues that "differing ap-
proaches" to separation of powers law all "serve the same over-
arching goal: cabining the exercise of state power by fragmenting 
that power among three distinct and potent branches of govern-
ment."160 It would not be surprising if the Justices in the control-
ling bloc cite diffusion-of-powers concerns, but these concerns 
cannot justify the Court's track record by themselves. The Jus-
tices in this bloc worry about diffusion of power when Congress 
threatens to exercise several powers at once, but not when bu-
reaucrats pose a similar threat. This insight also explains why the 
Court tries to reconcile New Deal functionalism and original-
intent formalism on the ground that the latter applies only when 
Congress "usurps" or "aggrandizes" the prerogatives of the 
agencies and the other branches of the government. 161 Congres-
sional aggrandizement is especially dangerous because, from the 
Progressives' point of view, it is the "political" branch par excel-
lence. 
Others might question whether Progressive ideas are too far 
out of vogue for judges and lawyers to take them seriously 80 
years later. Elizabeth Magill has criticized this article's interpre-
tation on that ground. The "serious skepticism of agency deci-
sionmaking that is now reflected in administrative law doc-
157. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952,953 n.16 (1989). 
158. See id. at 964 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
159. See Merrill, supra note 71, at 228,251. 
160. M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers 
Law, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 603,607-08 (2001). 
161. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); CFTC v. Schor, 478 
U.S. 833 (1986). 
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trines," she argues, makes it implausible to think that courts sub-
scribe to Progressive ideas about administration in their constitu-
tional docket.162 Magill refers here to the requirements of notice-
and-comment rulemaking, which force regulators to be transpar-
ent about the choices they make when they promulgate legisla-
tive rules/ 63 and the "hard look" doctrine, which forces agencies 
to identify sensitive legislative policy judgments they make. 164 
These doctrines arose in the 1970s, during an era in which con-
servative public-choice economists and liberal federal judges 
both suspected that agencies were captured by the interests they 
were supposed to be regulating. 165 One might also raise similar 
objections regarding the Chevron doctrine, which instructs 
courts to defer to agencies' reasonable interpretations of their 
organic statutes except when the statutory language clearly re-
quires a different result. 166 The Chevron doctrine, one might ar-
gue, shows that conservatives want to transfer the power to con-
strue broad delegations from independent agencies to the 
President. 167 In each of these subconstitutional administrative-
law doctrines, the broad coalitions in the constitutional separa-
tion of powers cases dissolve and more familiar conservative-
liberal divisions resurface. The conservatives support executive 
and agency powers, while the liberals remain skeptical of agen-
cies and prefer vigorous judicial review. 
These objections fairly describe the surface of administra-
tive law now, but it is crucial to put the relevant doctrines in 
their proper, subconstitutional perspective. These specific dis-
agreements play out within the context of a broader institution-
alist agreement about the Progressive theory of apolitical ad-
ministration. Contemporary judicial conservatives and liberals 
may harbor doubts about Progressive administrative theory, but 
they agree with it and with each other far more than they agree 
162. Magill, supra note 10, at 71 n.l01 (2004). I am grateful not only to Professor 
Magill but also to John Griesbach and Sai Prakash for encouraging me to address the 
objections presented in this paragraph. 
163. See Conn. Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Gary Law-
son identifies the connection between notice-and-comment requirements and the skepti-
cism of which Professor Magill speaks in GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAw 254-65 (3rd ed. 2004 ). 
164. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29 (1982); see also LAWSON, supra note 163, at 536-43. 
. 165. See, e.g., LAWSON, supra note 163, at 9; see also id. at 257 (section on rise of no-
lice-and-comment rulemaking procedures in chapter 3). 
166. See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
167. The idea behind this criticism is laid out well in Martin S. Flaherty, The Most 
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996). 
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with the political theory that informs the original and formalist 
Constitution. With the possible exception of Justice Thomas, all 
the Justices accept that the agencies should or inevitably will get 
broad delegations from Congress. 168 With the possible excep-
tions of Thomas and Scalia, all accept that agencies should or in-
evitably will get the power to grosecute and adjudicate along 
with those rulemaking powers.1 With the same possible excep-
tions, all accept that agencies are generally better off when not 
directly supervised by members of Congress, who are more pa-
rochial and political and less cognizant of the national interest 
than the President. To be sure, all of these Justices are somewhat 
skeptical about the Progressive blueprint. They all worry that 
capture problems corrupt the Progressive ideal of apolitical ad-
ministration, and then fall out disagreeing about whether the 
President or the courts can better mitigate the capture problem. 
Even so, it is also telling that these normative debates are waged 
in the trenches of administrative law's subconstitutional doc-
trines, not constitutional separation of powers. With the possible 
exceptions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, everyone on the Bur-
ger and Rehnquist Courts has agreed that the Progressive ap-
proach was more or less inevitable. They disagree about how to 
fix some of that approach's side effects. 
Finally, it is worth noting that this Article's thesis can ex-
plain some otherwise strange puzzles about the Court's behav-
ior. For instance, it explains why the Court sanctioned giveaways 
of Article III powers in Thomas v. Union Carbide and CFTC v. 
Schor. The Court prevented similar giveways in Northern Pipe-
line and Plaut but in Thomas and Schor, as Steven Calabresi has 
observed, "[b]y claiming power to set up non-life tenured, non-
Article III tribunals to hear core federal cases, Congress directly 
diminishe[ d] the power of the Article III courts to perform their 
core function." 17° Calabresi has identified a strange puzzle, which 
is explained by "institutionalist" ideas about judicial power: The 
control group on the Burger Court did not understand the Arti-
cle III courts' institutional interests as Calabresi does (or as the 
framers probably did), but rather as the Progressives did. Under 
the Progressive theory of apolitical administration, better not to 
distract federal judges with questions of pesticide or futures law; 
far more preferable for courts to leave such technical questions 
to administrative experts, and focus their attention elsewhere. 
168. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text. 
169. See supra notes 89-90, 117 and accompanying text. 
170. Calabresi, supra notes 138, at 81. 
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Let us conclude by considering how this interpretation af-
fects our perceptions of the Rehnquist Court. Of course, the 
conclusions in this Part are provisional because of the "blind 
men and the elephant" problem: What passes as an accurate ex-
planation of separation of powers law may seem a gross over-
generalization as applied to free speech, privacy, or federalism. 
Nevertheless, it is striking that, in a first-rank area of constitu-
tional law, everyone on the Court except Justice Thomas and 
sometimes Justice Scalia used two sharply different methodolo-
gies to reinforce a Progressive/New Deal understanding of gov-
ernment structure. This pattern may call into question many por-
traits of the Rehnquist Court. 
One dominant theme in the retrospectives written thus far 
holds that the Rehnquist Court has been a strongly conservative 
Court. The more hostile reviews suggest that that the Rehnquist 
Court has been "conservative, not in the sense that it is following 
conservative judicial principles, but rather ... in the sense that it 
is animated by the right-wing political agenda." 171 More sympa-
thetic interpretations cast doubt on whether its conservative de-
velopments are illegitimate. For example, John McGinnis has 
suggested that the Rehnquist Court has drawn on broad ideas 
shared by conservative elites during the 1970s and 1980s in the 
same indirect manner in which the late Warren Court and Jus-
tice Brennan's wing on the Burger Court drew on New Deal and 
Great Society trends among liberal elites. 172 
The Rehnquist Court's track record in separation of powers 
cases belies both of these interpretations. It does not by itself re-
fute either interpretation, but it does identify strong limits on the 
extent to which the Rehnquist Court has been politically conser-
vative. The Progressive theory of apolitical administration has 
171. Erwin Chcmerinsky, The Rehnquist Court & Justice: An Oxymoron?, 1 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL'Y 37, 37 (1999); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, The Rehnquist Court: 
Some More or Less Historical Comments, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: A 
RETROSPECfiVE 143, 151-52 (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002) (assuming that the Court is in 
some respects an "obviously a conservative Court," and rejecting as "surely a mirage" 
the suggestion that the Rchnquist Court's decisions are politically neutral); Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative Paths" of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 
U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002). See generally DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE 
MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1992); STANLEY H. FRIEDELBAUM, 
THE REHNQUIST COURT: IN PURSUIT OF JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (1994). 
172. See McGinnis, supra note 5, at 498-507. See generally KENNETH W. STARR, 
FIRST AMONG EQUALS: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE (2002). 
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been conventional wisdom among legal elites in this country 
since at least the middle of the twentieth century. During the 
1980s and 1990s, Justices Scalia and Thomas and many younger 
conservative constitutional-law academics developed a compre-
hensive original-meaning critique of separation of powers, en-
couraged in large part by precedents like Buckley and Chadha. 173 
That critique, however, seems to have had little influence on 
otherwise-conservative Justices like Kennedy, O'Connor, and to 
an extent Rehnquist. 
To be sure, the Rehnquist Court has reached more conser-
vative results in other areas, and an encompassing retrospective 
would need to reconcile separation of powers with such areas. 
But the case study presented here suggests it is important to ex-
amine whether and to what extent changes elsewhere were lim-
ited by elite conventional wisdoms on a par with the Progressive 
theory of apolitical administration. For instance, as I have shown 
elsewhere, academic property theory, land-use law, and land-use 
scholarship stopped the Rehnquist Court from laying down any-
thing more than extreme-case limitations on contemporary land-
use regulations. 174 And as Michael Rappaport has suggested, 
most of the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions are "mainly 
of symbolic importance."175 As I hope to explain in subsequent 
scholarship,176 Progressive-New Deal attitudes toward federalism 
and centralized government still command enough respect 
across the Rehnquist Court to have limited the scope of its fed-
eralism project. 
Another common theme holds that the Rehnquist Court has 
been an "activist" court. 177 Of course this theme can be hard to 
engage, because the term "activist" is slippery and begs basic 
questions about what counts as "sound" or "activist" interpretta-
tion. Even so, the Court's track record in separation of powers 
defies the most common characterization. The Court intervened 
only when Congress tried to exercise direct control over an 
173. See, e.g., Arnold I. Burns & Stephen 1. Markman, Understanding Separation of 
Powers, 7 PACE L. REV. 575 (1987). 
174. See Claeys, supra note 113, at 199-216. 
175. See Rappaport, supra note 131, at 372. 
176. See Eric R. Claeys, "Sabri, Lane, and Hood: The Progressive Limits on the 
Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions" (manuscript on file with author). 
177. See, e.g., THOMAS KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD 
TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (2004);THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT (Herman Schwartz ed., 2002); see also LARRY KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004); Larry Kramer, Foreword, We the Court, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 4 (2001). 
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agency (Washington Airports) or Article III courts (Plaut), or to 
give extremely broad powers to the President (Clinton v. City of 
New York). In the independent-counsel provisions in Morrison 
and the Sentencing Guideline provisions in Mistretta, the Court 
let pass federal laws that could plausibly have been considered 
drastic changes from the status quo. In short, the Court was not 
activist very often in the sense that it defied Congress's will; only 
once, in Clinton, could it be said that the Court was activist in 
the sense that it defied the expectations of knowledgeable legal 
observers. 
Indeed, separation of powers is especially telling because it 
teaches as much about the Court's critics as it does about the 
Court. Separation of powers provides a nice contrast to federal-
ism, takings, and other fertile fields on the Rehnquist Court, be-
cause it blossomed, peaked, and faded about a decade before 
these other fields. Buckle(; reenergized separation of powers law 
as United States v. Lopez 78did the Commerce Clause and Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council179did the Takings Clause two 
decades later. Some academics immediately reacted hostilely, 
charging that the Burger Court was making "drastic changes" in 
separation of powers law. 180 The academic commentary became 
less critical and more accommodating in the late 1980s, as the 
late Burger and early Rehnquist Court confined the originalist 
revival. Some articles chided the Court for its incoherence,181 
while others benignly recast the cases to conform to Progressive-
New Deal administrative theory. 182 In the 1990s, after it became 
clear that separation of powers was no longer a growth area, the 
field ceased to interest most constitutional scholars who are not 
originalists. The commentary on the Rehnquist Court's federal-
ism project, if more heated, still seems to be following the same 
trend: The Rehnquist Court's early forays into federalism pro-
voked voluminous scholarship, 183 but recent decisions favoring 
Congress184 have attracted much less attention. In short, Progres-
178. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
179. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
180. John M. Burkoff, Appointment and Removal Under the Federal Constitution: 
The Impact of Buckley v. Valeo, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1335, 1336 (1976). 
181. Elliott, supra note 12; Chemerinsky, supra note 12. 
182. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 12. 
183. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 1; Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understand-
ing the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1052-53 (2001); Vicki C. Jackson, 
Semmole Tnbe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte 
Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495 (1997); Donald H. Zeigler, The New Activist Court, 45 
AM. U. L. REV. 1367 (1996). 
184. See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004); Nevada Dept. of Human 
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sive-New Deal expectations may go a long way in shaping consti-
tutional scholars' expectations about what counts as "proper" 
adjudication and what counts as "activism" in structural constitu-
tional law. 
The separation of powers cases also correct another account 
of the Rehnquist Court-the "leadership" explanation. Mark 
Tushnet has suggested that one of the "largely unremarked" fea-
tures of the Rehnquist Court has been that the liberal Justices 
have presented a unified front on many issues. 185 He attributes 
this fact to several factors- especially partisan divisions between 
the traditional and movement Republicans on the Court, 186 and 
Justice Stevens' "leadership" skills, 187 which he contends have 
been superior to the Chief Justice's or Justice Scalia's. 188 
To appreciate the more insightful aspects of Tushnet's in-
terpretation, it helps to consider how the liberals, Tushnet's 
"traditional" Republicans, and his "movement" all stand juris-
prudentially in relation to each other. On large issues of consti-
tutional structure, it does not take much leadership to convince 
the liberals to hang together. In separation of powers and 
probably elsewhere, they have stayed within the conventional 
wisdom about separation of powers. Similarly, Justices Kennedy 
and O'Connor are all much more inclined to be "led" toward the 
liberals than toward the diehard conservatives. Like the liberals, 
Kennedy and O'Connor assume that the country's political and 
constitutional developments through the 1970s are basically le-
gitimate and have been salutary for the country. That is why they 
have voted in lockstep with the liberals in separation of powers 
cases. By contrast, because Justices Scalia and Thomas are 
originalists, their methodology raises unsettling questions about 
the New Deal transformation in separation of powers. 189 
Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
185. Mark Tushnet, Pragmatism and Judgment: A Comment on Lund, 99 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 289,290 (2004). 
186. MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE 
fUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 69-70 (2005). 
187. Tushnet, mpra note 185, at 289. That said, Tushnet does not make this leader-
ship claim as assertively in his book as he does in the articles that led to the book. In the 
book, Tushnet does not treat Stevens at length, suggesting only that Justice Stevens was 
more strategic than the Chief Justice at assigning opinions to keep the moderates on 
board liberal positions. See TUSHNET, supra note 186, at 86; see also id. at 112-13 (Ste-
vens' background). 
188. See TUSHNET, supra note 186, at 86 (Rehnquist's refusal to assign opinion stra-
tegically); id. at 263 (Rehnquist's unimaginative opinion writing); id. at 147-41 (Scalia's 
intemperateness toward his colleagues and injudiciousness in print). 
189. Again, with the exception that Scalia refuses to adopt what he understands to 
be the original meaning of the non-delegation doctrine as a rule for judicial decision. See 
2004] PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL THEORY 443 
Finally, then, separation of powers cases confirm the last 
broad portrait of the Rehnquist Court-that it is in fact an 
"O'Kennedy Court." While earlier retrospectives tended to por-
tray the struggle between the liberal and conservatives on the 
Court,' 90 a consensus is now emerging that Justices O'Connor 
and Kennedy are key to understanding the behavior of the 
Rehnquist Court. Separation of powers cases confirm this later 
consensus, supplementing it mainly to underscore how important 
it is to appreciate O'Connor and Kennedy's basic jurisprudential 
commitments. Some accounts suggest that O'Connor and Ken-
nedy vote primarily in response to trends in elections or in Con-
gress.191 Tushnet attributes their voting behavior to the fact that 
they are Rockefeller Republicans, not Goldwater Republi-
cans.192 Nelson Lund attributes O'Connor's behavior to a prag-
matic jurisprudential streak. 193 Thomas Keck suggests that 
O'Connor and Kennedy are trying to reconcile a tension be-
tween judicial conservatives' commitment to "restraint and [a] 
New Right commitment to limited government." 194 While all of 
these accounts are largely accurate, none gives enough due to 
the fact that O'Connor and Kennedy subscribe to many princi-
ples of political theory and jurisprudence that lie well within the 
mainstream of legal thought as marked off by the U.S. Reports 
and scholarship from the legal academy. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the last 30 years, the Progressive theory of apolitical 
administration seem to have permeated the "fundamental law" 
that informs the Supreme Court's separation of powers cases. 
When it applies, this theory predicts how the Court will decide 
separation of powers challenges. It predicts how the Court will 
decide the merits of such cases. It predicts whether the Court 
will apply original-intent formalism or New Deal functionalism. 
When the Court applies original-intent formalism, Progressive 
supra notes 113, 138-139 and accompanying text. 
190. See, e.g., THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT, supra 
note 177; FRIEDELBAUM, supra note 171; Richard J. Lazarus, Rehnquist's Court, 47 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 861 (2003). 
191. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 71, at 628-38; Rappaport, supra note 131, at 370 
(2004) (describing the O'Connor Court as "politically moderate and sensitive to its public 
reputation," and "especially concerned about its political capital") 
192. See TUSHNET, supra note 186, at 32,48-49. 
193. See Nelson Lund, The Rehnquist Court's Pragmatic Approach to Civil Rights, 99 
Nw. U. L. REV. 249,250 (2004). 
194. KECK, supra note 177, at 203. 
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principles explain how the Court manages to limit its originalist 
holdings so as not to undermine the administrative state. Finally, 
when the Court balances interests using New Deal functional-
ism, the same principles determine how heavily competing policy 
interests hang in the functionalist balance. 
This connection to Progressive political theory explains an 
important puzzle in separation of powers law over the last thirty 
years, but it also has important ramifications for studying the 
Supreme Court generally. The separation of powers case study 
presented here helps put the late Burger Court and the 
Rehnquist Court in a sensible historical perspective in relation to 
previous Courts. The same case study also offers useful warnings 
for ongoing efforts to develop retrospectives of the Rehnquist 
Court. The Rehnquist Court has been activist or conservative in 
important respects. Even so, we must not forget that the 
Rehnquist Court is also limited in important respects by Pro-
gressive and New Deal ideas, which continue to influence aca-
demics and lawyers' expectations about good government and 
good constitutional interpretation. 
